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PRELIHINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 31, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 80-328 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
v. 
BELTON 
Cert to NY CA 
(Cooke; Gabriel li , 
Jasen, dissenting) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr, the State of New York, conte nds that the 
New York CA improperly concluded that a warrantless search and 
seizure of a jacket inside a car could not be justi ~ ied as a 
search incident to a lawful arrest. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In April 1978, ~ esp and three 
- 2 -
• trooper for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer 
discerned the distinct odor of marijuana emanating fcorn within 
and recognized on the floor an envelope that is commonly used to 
sell the substance. At that point, the officer ordered the 
occupants out of the vehicle, patted each down, removed the 
envelope from the floor and discovered that it did contain 
marijuana. The officer then placed the occupants, who were 
----~ 
standing outside the car, under arrest. He then reentered the ----------- - "'---
vehicle, searched the passenger cornpartrnen t and seized rna r i ju ana 
cigarette butts lying in the ashtrays. He also looked through 
n. "' the pockets of the five jackets that were lying on the back seat, 
opened the zippered pocket of one of them, and discovered cocaine 
and res~s identification. 
The trial court denied resp's motion to suppress the c-
'- cocaine, and resp pled guilty to attempted possessio~ of a 
criminal substance. A unanimous appellate court affirmed, 
holding the warrantless search of the jacket lawful as incident 
to resp's arrest for possession of marijuana. Chirnel v. 
Ca 1 i for n i a , 3 9 5 U . S . 7 5 2 ( 19 6 9 ) . 
The New York CA rev~rsed. Under Chirnel, it is reasonable 
for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless 
"search of the arrestee's person and the area within his 
immediate control - construing that phrase to mean the area 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructable 
evidence". Thus, the critical inquiry is whether the jacket was 
within an area where resp could reasonably gain access to it or 
whether the jacket was within an area within the exclusive 
- . - 3 -
control of the police. Citing United States v. Cha~wick, 433 
u.s. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1978), the 
CA concluded that the area was within the exclusive control of 
the officer and that resp retained an expectation of privacy in 
his jacket pockets. Given that the car was in a secure place 
where it could easily have been guarded and given that the 
occupants were under arrest and safely away from the car, there 
was no reason why the search could not have awaited the issuance 
of a warrant. 
Judge Gabrielli dissented on the grounds that there was 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the lower courts' 
finding that the jackets were within the reach of the four 
suspects and had not yet been reduced to the exclusive control of 
the officer. The majority erred in finding as a matter of law 
that merely because the suspects were under arrest and were 
standing outside the car at the time of the search, both their 
persons and their property had thereby conclusively and safely 
been reduced to the complete control of the officer. To the 
. 
contrary, this is the type of case where a warrantless search is 
most appropriate. At the time of the search, conducted by a lone 
officer who had arrested four unknown individuals for possession 
of a controlled substance, the situation was still fluid. The 
suspects were standing by the sid~ of the car and neither they 
nor their property had as yet been reduced to the exclusive 
control of the officer. The officer was still in d~nger and any 
evidence remaining in the car could easily have been destroyed. 
- . - 4 -
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that the officer 
acted improperly in searching the jackets. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first contends th~t Judge Gabrielli's 
dissent is correct. Because the suspects were all standing at 
various points around the car, it would have been imminently 
possible and plausible for one or more of the four to lunge 
inside the car to grab a weapon or to destroy evidence. The 
trooper acted in an entirely appropriate fashion under the 
circumstances. He could not immobili ze all four defendants. He 
had the right and duty to make certain that his safety was not 
threatened by the four men whom he had just arrested and that any 
evidence secreted in the car was not destroyed. 
Second, petr asserts that the New York CA interpretation of 
the search incident to a lawful arrest doctrine is inconsistent 
with the decision of other state and federal courts. In United 
States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d. 621 (DC Cir. 1978), for example, 
a search of a jacket on the front seat of a car was held proper 
where two suspects were outside the car and one was seated in the 
car amid five police officers. In United States v. Agostino, 608 
F.2d. 1035 (CA 5 1979), the court held proper the seizure of 
contraband on the floor of the car which the defendant had just 
left. In North Carolina v. Hunter, 261 S.E.2d. 189 (1980), the 
court upheld the search of a car where each arrestee was near the 
car and his hands placed on the car's roof. 
Resp first notes that \-Then the trooper conduct<~d a pat down 
search of the jacket he felt no dangerous instrumen t s hidden 
t inside the jacket. Holding the jacket in one hand and thus 
- 5 -. . 
• reducing it to his exclusive possession, he nevertheless unzipped 
( 
.... and opened all of the pockets. Thus, the decision below was 
correct. Moroever, the cases relied on by petr are 
distinguishable. In United States v. Wilkerson, the court upheld 
the search because after the defendant had alighted from the 
vehicle, the officer reached into the front seat and placed his 
hand on a coat, pressed it and felt something like a shotgun. In 
United States v. Agostino, the court upheld the warrantless 
seizure of cocaine because it was in plain view or, 
alternatively, because it found that the defendant driver could 
reach the floor of the front seat of the vehicle. Here, in 
contrast, there was no finding in the trial court that the jacket 
lying in the middle of the back seat of a two-door vehicle, was 
r · accessible to any of the four defendants, all of whom were 
standing outside of the automobile. In State v. Hunter, there 
existed a probable cause to believe that a gun was present in the 
vehicle. 
4. DISCUSSION: The cases relied on by petr are 
distinguishable from this one. The trooper here apparently had 
no reason to believe that a weapon was contained inside the 
jacket pocket. Also militating against granting cert here is 
that there appears to be no dispute over the appropriate legal 
standard to be applied, only a factual dispute as to whether the 
jacket was in the exclusive control of the police. On the other 
hand, to the extent the CA adopted a rule of law pro~ibiting 
warrantless searches whenever the suspects are standing outside a 
( vehicle, the rule is probably too restrictive. It may be too 
( 
- 6 -
easy for a court to second quess a police officer as to what is 
or is not within the officer's "e~clusive control". 
There is a response. 
10/9/80 
JBP 
Knauss Op in petn. 
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~~· ~~~ 
Question Presented PD  ~-
May an officer, without a warrant but pursuant to a 
valid arrest, search closed containers within an automobile 
after the arrested persons have been removed form the 
automobile? 
I 
This case raises an issue, the resolution of which 
has bedeviled the Court for 60 years: upon arrest how wide an 
area around the person of an arrestee may a policeman search 
~
without a warrant. In United States v. Robinson, 414 u.s. 218 
~
(1973), the Court conclusively determined that the officer may 
search the entire person of the arrestee. Dispute about the 
area around the arrestee traces back to Carroll v. United 
. ·~ #, , 
2. 
States, 267 u.s. 132 (1925). At one time, the rule was that 
upon arrest the officers could search "the place" where the 
arrest was made; thus, it was proper for officers to search an 
entire four room house where the arrest was made, including 
desk, safe, and file cabinets, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
u.s. 56 (1950). 
~ 
Today, the general rule is stated by Chimel v. 
----- ----
California, 395 u.s. 752 (1969), which overruled Rabinowitz. A 
prime principle expressed in Chimel is that a warrantless 
search should be no broader in scope thn necessary to satisfy 




(1968). Thus, the search incident to arrest should 
only as broad as necessary to permit vindication of 
interests ~afety of the officer during a dangerous 
an~reserv~i~of evidence that the arrestee might 
conceal or destroy. 
"There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee's person and the area 
'within his immediate control' - construing that 
phrase to mean e area rom within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence. 
There is no comparable justification, 
however, for routinely searching any room other 
than that in which an arrest occurs--or, for 
that matter, for searching through all the desk 
drawers or other closed or concealed areas 
within that room itself." Chimel, supra, 763. 
There is, of course, a degree of ambiguity about how many 
closed containers within the room where the search is 
effectuated may be searched; the opinion does indicate that a 
desk drawer closed in front of the arrestee may be immediately 
3. 
searched because it is in the grabbable area. Id. Obviously, 
there will be circumstances where it is difficult to say 
whether an area within a room is within a grabbable area. 
Resolution of these question, analogous to the question now 
before the Court, requires a sensitivity to the circumstances 
of the officer, who must make quick decisions while safely 
retaining custody of the arrestee, and the evils of too loose 
an interpretation of the rule. The chief evil of a broad search 
after arrest is that such a search is similar to a general 
warrant: the officer need have no clear idea of what he is 
looking for or where to look. The happenstance of being at a 
certain place when arrested gives little justification for 
generally searching the place. See generally United States v. 
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 19 ) (L.Hand, J.). 
There are two other ingredients to the analysis, both 
stemming originally from Robinson, supra. First, there is the I 
question of the diminished expectation of privacy that an 
arrestee is left with. Id., at 237 (Powell, J., concurring). 
There you wrote that once that state has intruded into the 
privacy of a person by taking him into custodial arrest, the 
additional intrusion of a search of the person is so small that 
a full search of the person is justified "even if that search 
is is not narrowly limited by the twin rationales of seizing 
evidence and disarming the arrestee." 
Does this rationale help decide the scope of the area 
around the arrestee that may be searched? I think not. While 
arrest diminishes the arrestee's reaonable expectation of 
4. 
~~ 
privacy in his own person, of which the state takes custody, it 
does not diminish his privacy in his papers and effects outside 
his immediate control. While the arrest may prevent the 
arrestee from using his possessions himself, it does not give 
others license to use them. If it did, his possessions wherever 
situated would be open to inspection. Thus, the diminshed sense 
of privacy in one's own person caused by arrest is irrelevant 
to the arrestee's other privacy interests. 
Second, Robinson urged that an officer always could 
search the person of the arrestee; the question of whether one 
of the justifications for the search existed in fact need not 
be litigated in every case. The Court emphasized that the 
offcier must make a quich judgment under pressure, and the 
propriety of the search of an individual should "not depend on 
what a court 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence of 
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the 
suspect." 414 u.s., at 235. I think this point is quite 
pertinent to the scope of the area subject to the search 
incident to arrest. It would be intolerable to require the 
officer to make nice calculations about the probability that an 
arrestee would reach for a certain drawer or briefcase for a 
weapon in a tense situation, subject to being second guessed in 
court. The officer must be given some leaway and he should be 
guided by a clear rule, like allowing him always to search the 
person of the arrestee, to the extent feasible. The problem is 
not to swallow the salutary restraint in making a rule to cover 
5. 
the myriad circumstances and places where arrests occur. This 
problem is vividly illustrated by the facts of this case. After 
stating them I will address the complications created here by ~ 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753 (1979). 
~~~ 
II 
t\.The officer stopped a car for speeding on a lonely 
road. Four men were inside and the offcer detected the oder of ---- ------
burnt marijuana. He ordered them out, patted them down, and 
ordered themn to stand apart near the car. He then returned to 
examine a suspicious envelope on the floor of the car and found 
marijuana therein. 
~
arrest, read them 
He formally placed the indivuals 
their Miranda rights, and searched 
under~ 
the~/-
persons. He then proced ed to seac~ the interior of the car. He 
found jackets in the back seat~ in the zippered pockets of one 
he found cocaine and resp's ID card. 
The N.Y. App. Di v. upheld the search. It held that --
the search was jusitifed as a search incident to arrest, in 
that the search of the "immediate area" where the search , .... ,, 
occurred was "reasonable in scope, intensity and duration. The 
N.Y. Ct. App. reversed. It relied on a statement from United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977): "Once .•. oficers 
have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediaetly 
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive 
control and their is no longer any danger that the arrestee 
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destriy 
evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of 
the arrest." The ct then held that 1) the jacket is a private 
6. 
receptacle desrerving the same protection as a sui tease; 2) 
"[o] nee defendant has been removed from the automobile and 
placed under arrest, a search of the interiors of a private 
receptacle safely within the exclusive custody and control of 
the pol ice may not be upheld as incident to his arrest." The 
dissenter simply disagreed with the majority about whether 
there was an exigncy jusi tfying an immediate search of the 
jacket pockets; he emphaisizes that there were 4 arrestees 
standing proximate to the car and one officer to control them. 
"The situation was still fluid, and neither the suspects 
themselves nor their property had as yet been reduced to the 
exclusive and certain control of the police." Thus, it would 
appear that the majority and the dissent below agreed on the 
principle to be applied, but disputed the characterization to 
give the facts: was there a reasonable chance that one of the 
suspects could reach into the car to remove seething from the 
jacket poceket. 
It will be observed that the problem presened here is 
~ cr~ated by Chadwick and Sanders. If the police could open 
·o pr1vate containers found in a car they could have searhced the 
pockets here without a warrant regardless of the scope of the 
privilege to seacrh incident to arrest. Nonetheless, as my memo 
on Robbins perhaps indicates, I think that those decisions are 
plainly compelled by the policies of the Fourth Amendment. 
The first holding of the N.Y. Ct. of App. open to 
question, but not addressed by the parties is whether the 
arrest quite simply extinguished resp's privacy interest in the 
I 7 • 
~~ 
pockets of his jacket. If there had been no arrest, I would ~
easily conclude that resp has the same privacy interest in his 
zippered pocket that he would have in a suitcase or a wrapped 
and sealed package, see my Robbins memo. However, it is plain 
that if resp had been wearing the jacket at the time of the 
arrest the officer could have searched the zippered pocket --------------- ------- ---------------------~~------~ 
without further ado. See Robinson, supra; United States v. 
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). It is arguable that his loosely 
lying jacket at the scene of the arrest, even if physically 
inaccessible at the time of the seacrh because within the car, 
is no less open to immediate seacrh. In the language of 
Chadwick, the jacket is subject to search upon the same terms 
as the aresstee' s person becuase so "immediately associated 
wi ~rson." Upon consideration, I would reject an j 
attempt to treat clothing as a class of containers different 
from luggage. The truely salient fact in each situation is 
whether the container is within the reach of the arrestee. If 
the arrestee requests his - jacket, it may be searched at that 
time, of course, because the rationales for search incident to 
• 
arrest become pertinent. 
It might be argued that upon arrest of the drivers of 
a car, the car and its entire contents are subject to imediate 
search. This would mark a return to the rule of Rabinowitz as 
least as it pertains to cars. Significantly, Sanders and 
Chadwick tend to refute the argument that their basic 
protection for contaipers should not apply during arrest. In 
both those cases, the luggage was seized by the police during 
) 
7 
an arrest. A warrant 
~~~~~8-~ 
~4~~ 
was required by the Court in both ~ 
instances. In Chadwick, this was an easy question, since the 
luggage there was not opened until 10 days after the arrest; no 
-------------------------------------------------------
exigency jusitifed that search. Nonetheless, this seems 
potentially of limited import given the rule of United States 
v. Edwards, supra, inexplicably not cited in Chadwick, that 
clothing subject to search at the time of the arrest can later 
be searched. Moreover, in Sanders, the luggage was seized and 
opened contemporaneous with the arrest. The Court noted it was - -- ----
not considering the search of luggage pursuant to arrest, but 
went on to note that "it appears that the bag was not within 
[resp' s] immediate control at the time of the search." 442 
u.s., at 764, n. 11. While both cases are potentially 
distinguishable, they give no indication that containers 
outside the arrestee's immediate control are subject to 
warrantless search. 
If the only issue in this case was whether the 
arrestees could have reached the jacket, the case would not be 
certworthy. The general rule of Chimel would apply and the only 
issue would be whether the N.Y. Ct. of App. struck the right 
balance between protection of privacy and of the necessities of 
law enforcement in this particular fact situation. Petr and 
resp do argue about this at some legnth. The state repeats the 
arguments of the dissenter and contends that necessary 
discretion of the officer was unduly confined. The situation 
was "fluid", there were four suspects and one officer, etc. 
Resp repeats the arguments of the majority and emphasizes that 
9. 
the search was plainly not conducted to prevent resp from 
grabbing a weapon or destructible evidence but to look for more 
incriminating evidence. This question seems essentially 
unimportant because the circumstances of a search would vary so 
much. I would tend to agree with the majority below because it 
seems plain that the search was conducted to gain evidence, not 
to prevent its desruction. 
The U.s. offers another resolution of the case. It 
suggests that the scope of the area around the arrestee subject 
to warrantless search should not be decided by asking what area 
is within the arrestee's immediate control. Such a rule 
confronts the officer with a difficult calculation likly to 
later be subject to second guessing by a court. Also, the 
"immediate control" rule would preclude the search of almost 
all containers because the officer will secure "immediate 
control" of the container before beginning to open it. It would 
be better to adopt a rule unrelated to the particular 
exigencies of a situation but tailored to the spatial and 
temporal proximity of the search to the arrest, just as the 
Court did in Robinson when it held that the person of an 
arrestee may be searched without inquiry into the actual 
exigencies. The SG says: "We submit it is reasonable under the 
"--
Fourth Amendment to permit the police, when a lawful arrest has 
occurred, to conduct a warrantless search of a container at the 
place of arrest if the search is substantially contemporaneous 
with ~ arrest ~d is co~fined to->thos~ within , the 
~ --~---~-----------------~--------------------
10. 
arrestee's otential reach at the time of the arrest." Brief at 
12. 
Thge SG's rule has a number of advatages. It is 
roughly consistent with Chimel. It replaces its focus on the 
reasons for the warrantless search with a spatial chart I 
I 
generally responsive to those reasons. This is consistent with 
Robinson. In Chimel, the Court said officers could search a 
desk drawer immediately in front of the arrested person, but 
~ 
did not t~s this power to a suspicion by the officer that the 
"" t<:. arrestee would rech into it for a waepon or evidence. The rule 
would be easier to administer both by the officer and the court ~ 
becaus eht factual question is easier. There is some 
plausibility to the contention, not made by the government, 
that the loss of privacy the arrestee has in his person upon 
arrest should extend to some area beyond his fingertips. 
Sanders may be{distinguished because the suitcase there was 
taken from the trunk of the car rather than the interior. 
There are disadvantages. The rule would in practice 
eliminate any warrant protection for containers in the interior 
of a car when a passenger or driver is arrested, because all 
such luggage is within the arrestee's potential reach. Also, it 
would give the police carte blanche to conduct a general 
search, albeit within a limited time and place. This would 
encourage the practice of arresting a suspect at a location 
where you wish to conduct a search. 
III 
11. 
Although the SG's view is plausible, I would retain 
the Chime! rule with one elaboration. The Chime! rule focusses 
on the reason we permit an exception to the warrant requirement 
in these circumstances. The exception is narrowly drawn to 
allow for valid exigencies associated with arrest. I would hold r~~$ 
I[ \'" •JV} . . J \,\ 
that an officer may search any containers potentially grabbable r~ 
------------'---~--~~--'-~----------------------------------by the arrestee if he has a reasonable, good faith belief that 
o recover a weapon o prevent --
the destruction of evidence. In my view, this limits the search 
to its proper scope, but gives the officer sufficient leaway 
that he may take the steps he believes are necessary to secure 
the scene without having to balance his safety against the 
threat that a court will suppress the evidence he finds. This 
rule is entirely consistent with Chadwick and Sanders. 
Applied to the facts of this case, my test would 
indicate that the judgment of the N.Y. Ct of App should be 
affirmed. A reading of the officer's testimony at the 
suppression hearing strongly suggests that jacket was searched 
in a general hunt for evidence of drug use rather than to 
-------~~~~--~~--~~~-,-~--~--~--======~ -------------
secure the scene of the arrest. Once the scene is secure there 
is no further law enforcement interest in generally searching 
the area without a warrant. Nonetheless, my emphasis on the 
reaonable subjective judgment of the officer about what steps 
are required, rather than an "objective", post-hoc assessment 
of whether the search was necessary, will give officers more 
disretion and reduce the amount of suppressed evidence. 
I ' 
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Miscellaneous Notes on Cases 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42. 
An automobile was stopped and occupants arrested 
on probable cause and the car was driven to the police 
station. There "in the course of a thorough search of the 
car, the police found concealed in a compartment under the 
dashboard" pistols and other evidence. p. 44. 
BRW, writing for the Court, noted that since the 
search occurred "sometime after the arrest" it was not a 
"search incident to arrest". There was "probable cause to 
believe that the robbers, carrying guns •. had fled the 
scene in a light blue station wagon". There was "probable 
cause to search the car for guns and stolen money", just as 
there was to stop the car and arrest the occupants - 47, 48. 
BRW wrote: 
"The Court has long distinguished between an 
automobile and a horne of office." (Citing 
Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132, at 
153-154, 155, 156. 
BRW stated that "the search of an automobile on 
probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from 
that justifying the search incident to an arrest" (p. 49) . 
He then quoted from Carroll as follows: 
"The right to search and the validity of the 
seizure are not dependent on the right to 
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable 
cause the seizure officer has for belief that 
the contents of the automobile offend against 
the law. 267 u.s., at 158, 159." 
Although recognizing that "every conceivable 
circumstance" does not justify an auto search, BRW further 
2. 
observed that "the circumstances that furnish probable cause 
to search a particular automobile for a particular article 
are most often unforeseeable." p. 51. 
Justice Harlan, dissenting, distinguished between 
search incident to arrest and the facts in Chambers. He 
said: 
"The Court has recognized that an arrest 
creates an emergency situation justifying a 
warrantless search of the arrestee's person 
and of the area from within which he might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence." Citing Chimel and Terry. 
Justice Harlan went on to say that: 
"Where officers have probable cause to search 
a vehicle on a public way, a further limited 
exception to the warrant requirement is 
reasonable because 'the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction'". Carroll v. u.s. Because the 
officers might be deprived of valuable 
evidence if required to obtain a warrant 
before effecting any search or seizure, I 
agree with the Court that they should be 
permitted to take the steps necessary to 
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station. There "in the course of a thorough search of the 
car, the police found concealed in a compartment under the 
dashboard" pistols and other evidence. p. 44. 
BRW, writing for the Court, noted that since the 
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BRW stated that "the search of an automobile on 
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"The right to search and the validity of the 
seizure are not d~pendent on the right to 
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable 
cause the seizure officer has for belief that 
the contents of the automobile offend against 
the law. 267 u.s., at 158, 159." 
2. 
Although recognizing that "every conceivable 
circumstance" does not justify an auto search, BRW further 
observed that "the circumstances that furnish probable cause 
to search a particular automobile for a particular article 
are most often unforeseeable." p. 51. 
Justice Harlan, dissenting, distinguished between 
search incident to arrest and the facts in Chambers. He 
said: 
"The Court has recognized that an arrest 
creates an emergency situation justifying a 
warrantless search of the arrestee's person 
and of the area from within which he might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence." Citing Chimel and Terry. 
Justice Harlan went on to say that: 
"Where officers have probable cause to search 
a vehicle on a public way, a further limited 
exception to the warrant requirement is 
reasonable because 'the vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction'"· Carroll v. u.s. Because the 
officers might be deprived of valuable 
evidence if required to obtain a warrant 
before effecting any search or seizure, I 
agree with the Court that they should be 
permitted to take the steps necessary to 
preserve evidence and to make a search 
possible." 
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Re: bbins v. Califor ia~~~ ~-~ 
New York v. Belton ~  
}(~.-e., ~di~  
I have reviewed all the relevant materials 1f S ~ j 
and a great many cases -- because, as I said at • • 
Conference, we are at an important "crossroad" ~~ 
where the courts, and police, need clearer /~~-
guidance than we have probably given them. ~~ ~ 
~~"~ Whether that is true or not, I am now 
per suaded that Potter's position-- shared by 
others -- that once probable cause is established 
for the arrest of any occupant of a vehicle, the 
interior of that vehicle in which the occupants 
are found, and all that is found in that interior , 
may be searched. This means, for me, jackets, 
pockets , packages , containers, glove compartments, 
etc . It does not include the trunk or the area 
under the hood . What the application to a truck 
or a van wi 11 be remains open. (For me, the cab 
and carrying area of such vehicles is the 
"interior".) 
This leads me to vote to reverse in Robbins 
and reverse in Belton. Potter will take these 
cases. 
Given the time of the year and Bill Brennan's 
vote in Lehman v. Nakshian (80-242), Bill has 
agreed to take it as "least persuaded". As of 
now, his vote would be dispositive. 
A revised assignment list is enclosed, with /~~~~ 
80-802, National Gerimedical Hospital and ~~ 
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City --
being reassigned to Lewis. 
Given the uncertainty of one or two other 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-328 
State of New York, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to thO' 
v. Court of Appeals of New 
Roger Belton. York. 
)~ 
[June -, 1981] -~ 
J usTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
When the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a 7 
lawful custodial arrest, does the constitutionally permissible 
1 
scope ofaSearch incident to his arrest include the passeuger 
1 
_ '!t;;-
compartment of the automobile in which he was riding? ~ a_ 
That is the question at issue: the present case. 
4 
/! 
On April9, 1978, Trooper Douglas Nicot, a New York State ~ 
policeman driving an unmarked car on the New York Thru-
way, was passed by another automobile travelling at an 
excessive rate of speed. Nicot gave chase, overtook the 
speeding vehicle, and ordered its driver to pull it over to the 
side of the road and stop. There were four men in the car, 
one of whom was Roger Belton, the respondent in this case. 
The policeman asked to see the driver's license and auto-
mobile registration, and discovered that none of the men 
owned the vehicle or was related to its owner. Meanwhile, 
the policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and had seen on 
the floor of the car an envelope marked "Supergold" that he 
associated with marihuana. He therefore directed the men 
to get out of the car, and placed them under arrest for the 
unlawful possession of marihuana. He patted down each of 
the men and "split them up into four separate areas of the 
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Thruway at this time so they would not be in physical touch-. 
ing area of each other." He then picked up the envelope 
marked "Supergold" and found that it contained marihuana. 
After giving the arrestees the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, the state policeman searched each 
one of them. He then searched the interior of the body of-
the car. On the back seat of the jar he found a black leather 
jacket belonging to Belton. He nzipped one of the pockets 
of the jacket and discovered cocaine. Placing the jacket in 
his automobile, he drove the four arrestees to a nearby police 
station. I 
Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of 
a controlled substance. In the trial court he moved that the 
cocaine the trooper had seized from the jacket pocket be 
suppressed. The court denied the motion. Belton then 
pleaded guilty to a lesser inciuded offense, but preserved his 
claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lefkowitz v. 
Newsome, 420 U. S. 283, 'Th~ ~pHellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court upheld ihe validity of the search and 
seizure, reasoning that " [ o] nee defendant was validly arrested 
j 
for possession of marihuana, ~pe officer was justified in search-
ing the immediate area for other contraband." 68 App. Div. 
2d 198, 201. 1 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed. holding that 
"[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unacces-
1 • 
sible jacket may not be u11held as a search iucident to a 
lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the 
arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the article." 
50 N. Y. 2d 447, 449. Two ju.dges dissented. They pointed 
out that the "search was conducted by a lone peace officer 
who was in the process of arresting four uuknowu individuals 
whom he had stopped in a speediug car owned by none of 
'them a11d apparently containing an u ncertaiu quantity of a 
controlled substauce. The ~.vspects were standing by the 
side of the car as the officer gave it a quick check to confirm 
80-328-:::0PINION 
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his suspicions before attempting to transport them to police 
headquarters ... " !d., at 545. We granted certiorari to con-
sider the constitutionally permissible scope of a search in cir-
cumstances such as these. - U. S. -. 
II 
It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprude11ce 
that the police may not conduct a sear·ch unless they first 
convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to 
conduct it. This Court has recognized , however, that "the 
exigencies of the situation" may sometimes make exemption 
from the warrant requirement "imperative." McDonald v. 
Un-ited States, 335 U. S. 451, 456. Specifically. the Court 
held iu Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, that a lawful 
custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the cou-
temporaneous search without a warrant of the perso11 arrested 
and of the immediately surrounding area. Such searches 
have long been considered valid because of the 11eed "to 
remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use 
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape" and the need to 
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. /d., at 
763. 
The Court's opinion in Chimel emphasized the pritlciple 
that, as the Court had said in 'Perry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19, 
"The scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified 
by' the circumstauces which rendered its initiation permis-
sible." Quoted in Chimel, supra, at 762. Thus while the 
Court in Chirnel found "ampie justification" for a search of 
"the area from withill which [an arrestee] might gain posses-
sion of a weap011 or destructib.le evidence." the Court found 
"no comparable justification . . . for routinely searching any 
room other than that in which an arrest occurs- or, for that 
matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other 
closed or concealed areas in that room itself." I d., at 763. 
Although the principle that limits a search incident to a 
'lawful custodial arrest may be stated clearly enough, courts 
80-328-0PINION 
_4 NEW YORK v. BELTON 
have discovered the principle difficult to apply iu specific 
cases. Yet, as at least one commentator has pointed out, the 
protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can 
only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules 
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct 
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of pri-
vacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement." LaFave, 
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Proced-
ures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 142. 
This is because 
"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by 
the exclusionary rule, · is primarily ill tended to regulate 
the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought 
to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by 
the police in the co11text of the law euforcemeut activities 
iu which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophis-
cated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, allds, and 
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle 11uances aud 
hairline distinctions. may be the sort of heady stuff upon 
which the facile minds of lawyers aud judges eagerly 
feed, but they may be 'literally impossible of application 
by the officer in the neid.'" I d., at 141. 
In short, "A single, familiar standard is essential to guide 
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests in-
volved in the specific circumstauces they coufront." Dun-
away v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213- 214. 
So it was that, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218, the Court hewed to a straightforward rule, easily applied, 
and predictably enforced: "(I]u the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest a full search of the person is not ouly an exception to 
the warrant requirement, but it is also a 'reasonable' search 
under that amendment." in so holdiug, the Court rejected 
the suggestion "that there must be litigated iu each case the 
issue of whether or not there ·w,s present one of the reasons 
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supporting the authority for a search of the person incident 
to a lawful arrest." 414 U. S. at 235. 
But no straightforward rule has emerged from the litigated 
Cl\SeS respecting the question involved here-the question of 
the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants. The 
difficulty courts have had is reflected in the conflicting views 
of the New York judges who dealt with the problem in the 
prese11t case. and is confirmed by a look at even a small 
sample drawn from the narrow class of cases iu which courts 
have decided whether, in the course of a search iucideut to 
the lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile. 
police may search inside the automobile after the arrestees 
are no longer in it. On the one haud, cases such as United 
States v. Sanders, 631 F. 2d 1309 (CA8 1980); U11ited States 
v. D·ixon, 558 F. 2d 919 (CA9 1977); and United States v. 
Frick, 490 F. 2d 666 (CA5 1973), have upheld such warrallt-
less searches as incident to lawful arrests. Ou the other hand, 
cases such as United States v. Benson, 631 F. 2d 1336 (CA8 
1980), and United States v. Rigales, 630 1~. 2d 364 (CA5 
1980), have held such searches constitutimtally invalid.1 
When a person cannot know how a court will apply a 
settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person 
cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor 
can a policeman know the scope of his authority. While the 
Chimel case established that a search incident to an arrest 
may not stray beyond the area withiu the immediate control 
of the arrestee. courts have found uo workable defiuition of 
"the area within the immediate control of the arrestee" when 
that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and 
the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases 
suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively 
t The state court ca:;eR are in similar di~array. See, e. g., llinkel v. 
A?tehorage, 618 P. 2d 1069 (Alaska 1980), and Ulesky ,., Florida, :379 So. 
'2d 121 (Fla. App. 1979). 
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narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an auto-. 
mobile are in fact commonly, even if not inevitably, within 
"the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab. 
a weapon or evidentiary item." Chirnel, supra, at 763. In 
order to establish the workable rule this category of cases 
requires, we read Chirnel's definitio11 of the limits of the 
area that may be searched in light of that generalization. 
Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a law-
ful custodial arrest of the occupa11t of an automobile,2 he 
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search 
the passenger compartment of that automobile.3 
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also 
examine the coutents of any contai11ers found withill the 
passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is 
within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be 
within his reach.4 United States v. Robinson, supra; Draper 
v. United States, 358 U. S. 307. Such a container may, of-
course, be searched whether. it is open or closed. since the 
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no 
privacy interest in the container. b{it that tile Tawfui custo<I!al 
arrest'.Justifies t'fie 1nTringem~nt of any privacy interest the 
arrestee may have. Thus. ~hile the Court in Chimel held 
that the police could not searc)1 all the tlrawers i11 an arrestee's 
house simply because the police had arrested him at home, 
t The validity of the custodial ; rrest. of Beltou hm; uut lwPn que~tioned 
in thi~ ca;;e. Cf. Gustafson v. Plo'iida 424 U. S. 260, 266 ( concurriug 
opinion). 
3 Our holding today does no more than determiur the mc•aning of 
Chimel's principles in thifl particula·r and problt>matie ronteut. It in no 
way alters the fundamental principle~ establi:slwd in the Chimel cu::;e 
regarding the basic scope of ISParches incident to lawful c·u:;todiHI arre:;t!:l. 
4 "Container" here denotes any object capable· of holding a not her object. 
It thu!:l includP~ closed or open glove compartments, eonsole~, or otlwr 
.l'eceptacle!:i located anywhere withir~ the pa~senger compartment, as well as 
luggage, boxes, bngl:i , clothing, and the like. Our holding <'ncompu~sP!:i only 
the intPrior of the pus::;enger complt:iiliment of an automobile aud doc!:! uot 
'encompass the trunk. 
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the C'ourt noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach could 
be searched because of the danger their contents might pose 
to the police. Chimel v. California, supra, at 763. 
It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes 
be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence 
of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested. 
However, in United States v. ~obinson, supra, the Court 
rejected the argument that such a container-there a 
"crumpled up cigarette package"-located dUI'ing a search of 
Robinson incident to his arrest could uot be searched: "The 
authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial 
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover 
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide 
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that 
weanons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person 
of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on I 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incide11t 
to the arrest requires no additional justification." !d., at 235. 
The New York Court of Appeals relied UDon United States 
v. Chadwick. 4~3 U. S. 1. and Arkansas v. Sanders. 442 U. S. 
753, in concluding that the search and !'leizure in the present 
case were constitutionally invalid.5 But neither of those 
case!': involved au arguably va1id search incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest. As the Coutt pointed out in the Chadwick 
case, "Here the search was conducted more than all hour 
aftf'r federal agents had gained exclusive COJJtrol of the foot-
locker and long after respondents were securely in custody; 
fi It ~eem~ to have been the theory of the Court of Appeal~ that the 
search and ~Pizure in thr prr~ent casP eould not have bc·rn incident to the 
rei:ipondent's arre::;t, becan;;e Trooper Nieot, by the vrr~· act of ~enrC'hing 
the respondent'~ jacket and seizing t'he content8 of itR pocket, had gained \ 
"exclu~ive control" of thrm. - 50 N. Y. 2d, at - . Hut lllldPr this 
fnllnC'iou~ thPorv no Rearch or seizure incident to n lawful eu~todial arrP»t 
1would ever be ~nlid ; by seizing an art'iclr even on tlw nrrr~tpp';: per~on, nn 
·officer may be l:iaid to have reduced t'ftat article to his "exelu~ive control.'~'-
. " 
, . 
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tht searc:h therefore eannot he viewed a:s incidental to the 
arrest or as justified by any othP-r exigency.'' 433 l·. :-;, at 
15. Aml in the Sanders c~ase. the Court explicitly stated 
that. it did not "consider the constitutionality of searches of 
luggage incident to the arrest of its pOt:i!:iessor. ~ee. e. y., 
United StateM , .. Rvbin.<Jon, 414 "C'. A. 218 ( Hl7a). The :-\tate 
has not argued that rt-spondent's suitt:ase was ::;P-arched iuci-
dent to his arrest. and .it appears that tlw hag wa:s not withi11 
his 'inunediatc control' at the time of tl\l' :search." 442 U. S., 
at 764. ll. U. rflw suit(~ase iu question was in the trunk of 
the taxicab. Sec n, 4, supra.) 
III 
It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of 
a lawful custodial arrest on a charge of po8sessing marihuana. 
The search of the respondent's jacket followed immediately 
upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside the passenger 
oompartment of the car in which the respondent had been 
a pat!!S'enger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus 
within the area. which we have concluded was "within the 
arrestee~s .iu.unEdia.te control" within the meaniug of the 
Ckimel ease. The eeareh of the jacket, therefore, was a 
seardt incident to a la.wful custodial arrest, and it did not 
violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accm·d-
imlgly. the judgtw:-nt is reversed. 
It is so ordered .. 
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C HAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVE NS 
•: 
June 1, 1981 
Re: 80-328 - New York v. Belton 
Dear Potter: 
In stating the question in the first sentence of 
your opinion, and also in stating your conclusion at 
the end of the opinion, you use the term "custodial 
arrest." Is there a distinction of constitutional 
significance between a "custodial arrest" and an 
ordinary arrest? In other words, is it within the 
power of the State or local community to direct every 
law enforcement officer to bring ever y traffic offender 
into the police station for purposes of booking and 
setting a hearing date? I am inclined to think that 
the State has such power and that your opinion 
therefore extends, at least potentially, to every 
traffic arrest. 
I share your view that we need clearly defined 
rules for the guidance of police officers and the 
public, but because I believe an officer's right to 
open a passenger's briefcase must require something 
more than a speeding infraction by the driver of the 
car, I will not be able to join your opinion. 
Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully , 
,) J I I{,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.pt"tmt <lfltllrllt£ tlrt ~tb .itatt• 
._-ufringLm. ~. <!f. 2.llfi~~ 
June 1, 1981 
Re: No. 80-328 New York v. Belton 
Dear Potter: 
While I agree with the result your opinion reaches 
in this case, I may well write separately. 
Sincerely, vv---· 
Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
lfp/ss 6/2/81 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
This is one of many 
application of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 5 
automobile searches. Although the principles remain 
constant, we often have recognized the diminished 
expectation of privacy with respect to what one usually 
carries in an automobile. In this case, the Court 
properly relies on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1970), 10 
Chimel v. California, 395 u.s. 752 (1971); and United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) for the applicable 
general principles. Yet, the setting in which the 
principles were applied differed. In Chimel, the scope of 
a search incident to an arrest in a residence was at 15 
issue. In Terry, there was a stop of an individual on a 
street for a pat down. Robinson was the only one of these 
cases involving an automobile. As we said in United 
States v. Martinez-Fuertes, 428 u.s. 543, at 561, (1976), 
"one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of 20 
freedom in its operation are significantly different from 
2. 
the traditional expectations of privacy and freedom in 
one's residence." See United States v. Oritz, 422 u.s. 
891, at 896, n. 2 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 
42, at 48 (1970). 
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, decided 
only two years ago, after citing Carroll v. United States, 
267 u.s. 132, 153, we observed: 
"There are essentially two reasons for the 
distintion between automobiles and other private 
property. First, as the Court repeatedly has 
recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles 
often makes it imp~acticable to obtain a 
warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Cnadwick, 
453 U.S., at 12; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S., 
at 49-50; Carroll v. United States, supra. In 
addition, the configuration, use and regulation 
of autOIJIObiles often may dilute the reasonable 
expectation of privacy that exists with respect 
to differently situated property. See Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 155 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring); United States v. Chadwick, supra; 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364, 368 
(1978); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 u.s. 583, 590 
(1974) (plurality opinion); Cadt v. Dombrowski, 
413 u.s. 433, 4~1-(42 (1973); A me1da-sanchez v. 
United States, 413 u.s. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, 
J., concurring." 
Automobiles are driven and parked on public streets and in 
w 
public places; they stop at tr~ffic lights, are subject to 
being stopped for traffic violations, and friends and even 
strangers often are in vi ted to ride in them. Moreover, 











In sum, in applying the general principles of 
search and seizure law, courts also properly take into 
consideration the "distinction between automobiles and 
other private property". Arkansas v. Sanders, id., at 
753.* 
*Cf. Robbins v. California, No. 80-148, decided today. 
There, we recognized the distinction between the 
"automobile exception" applicable in certain circumstances 
to the search of an automobile stopped with probable 
cause, and search of an automobile incident to ab..awful 
arrest. There may be, however, a diminished expedtation 







June 2, 1981 
80-328 New York v. Belton 
Please join me. 





.§np-r ttttt Qf!turlllf flrt ~b .§htf.tg 
'Jl)'rur~ ~. <!f. 20c?JI.;l 
JUSTICE W-. . J. BRENNAN, JR. June 2, 1981 I 
~ . 
RE: Nos. 80-328 New York v. Belton 
80-148 Robbins v. California 
Dear Potter: 
r•11 undertake a dissent in Belton, No. 80-328, 
and I may have a few suggestions in Robbins. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
~. 
CHAMBERS OF 
,§uprttnt <!fou.rt of tltt ~ttittlt .§htfu 
'lUaslying4rn, lS. <!f. 2llc?'!2 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
- -· 
B.e: No·. 80-328 .... State o:e New -:t"o:~;k v. Belton 
Dea;r Potter: 












CHAM BERS OF 
.§u:pumt <!Jourl of tltt ~tb .§taft$' 
~lyingt!tn. ~. OJ. 20~)!.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 3, 1981 
Re: 80-328 - New York v. Belton 
Dear Potter, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
/ 
.... 1!~ . /)/1 
I I i 
t 
Justice Stewart 





JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u1m <!fltltrl qf tlrt ~ttittb' ~mtts 
... &Sfringtlllt. ~. <If. 20,?'!~· 
Re: No. 80-328 - New York v. Belton 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
June 10, 1981 
/ 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
i 
;§u.prttttt ~omt of tilt~~ ,§tatts 
'JJ~fringht~ ~. ~· 2ll~Jl..;l 
June 10, 1981 














.:§ttprtmt Q}o-u.rt cf tfrt ~ttittlt .:§tai:ttl 
1Uasltingtcn.Jil. cq. 2.0?J-t-~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 16, 1981 
r 
Re: No. 80-328 - New York v. Belton 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
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